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RECENT BOOKS
BooK R.Evmws
JUDICIAL R.Evmw IN THE CONTEMPORARY WoRLD. By Mauro Cappelletti. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 1971. Pp. xv, 117. $8.50. Student edition $4.50.
The period following World War II may well be recorded in
history as one of the great epochs in the development of constitutionalism and the rule of law. Three phenomena may be singled
out as central to this development: (1) an extraordinary ferment
and productivity in the drafting and adoption of new written constitutions; (2) the recognition that a statement of fundamental rights
is basic to the constitutional order; and (3) a growing acceptance
of judicial review premised on the assumption that judicial control
of the constitutional order is necessary in order to preserve the integrity of the order and assure protection of fundamental rights.
This projection of judicial review into a new position of eminence
and acceptability has ignited Professor Cappelletti's interest. In this
slender but meaty and instructive volume, he gives us the distillate
of his wide and thorough scholarship in this area.
It may be surprising that in a book of little more than a hundred
pages of text an author would attempt the kind of synoptic survey
of judicial review that Professor Cappelletti undertakes in this volume.1 Only a person with the author's intellectual resources could
do this. Professor Cappelletti, who is a professor of law both at Stanford University and at the University of Florence and also Director
of the Institute of Comparative Law at the latter institution, has
the linguistic facilities that have made him knowledgeable with respect to the constitutional systeIIlS of a number of countries. This
store of knowledge includes a perceptive understanding of the constitutional system of the United States and the role of judicial review
in the operation of that system.
The function of judicial review in maintaining constitutional
control and the institutional forIIlS and procedures by which review

1. For an earlier treatment of judicial review in its comparative aspects, see the
excellent, comprehensive article by Professor W.K. Geck of the Law Faculty of the
University of the Saarland, Judicial Review of Statutes: A Comparative Survey of
Present Institutions and Practices, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 250 (1966). This article drew for
some of its sources on the compendious survey entitled VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT
(CONSTITUTIONAL REvmw IN THE WoRLD TODAY) (Carl Heymanns Verlag K.G., Koln•
Berlin 1962), published under the auspices of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign
Public Law and International Law of Heidelberg and based on the national reports
submitted to the Colloquium held on this subject at the Institute in 1961. See Pro•
fessor Geek's review of this very useful and important volume in 13 AM. J. COMP. L.
644 (1964). See also E. MCWHINNEY, JUDICIAL REVIEW (4th ed. 1969), which is a comparative treatment of the subject but is concerned principally with English-speaking
countries.
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is made effective furnish the focus of Professor Cappelletti's interest.
His basic approach is well stated in the closing paragraph of his
preface:
Constitutions express the "positivization" of higher values; judicial review is the method for rendering these values effective; and
the comparative method is the instrument of the movement towards
harmonization and of the search for internationally acceptable values. These three are essentially linked together and form an integral
part of the new direction in modern jurisprudence. [P. x.]

In the first chapter, the author recognizes that judicial review
is only one method of attaining what he calls "constitutional justice."
Some countries depend upon political control, whether through the
normal operation of a constitutional system or by explicit devices
for review of legislation through political organs, as a means of constitutional control of laws. The review by the Constitutional Council, which was created by the French Constitution of 1958, of a legislative enactment or an international treaty is essentially a political
control: the Council's assigned function and its behavior in exercising this function indicate that it does not function in a judicial capacity. Its control is one stage in the whole legislative process. In
Italy, political control over constitutionality is exercised by the President although judicial control is also exercised by the Italian Constitutional Court. In the Soviet Union, the function of reviewing the
constitutionality of laws and decrees is vested entirely in the major
policy-determining organs that enact these measures.
Just as the possibilities and means of political control over state
action are varied, so the possibility of judicial control is varied too.
In countries where the courts do not presume to pass on the validity
of legislation, they may achieve a form of control of constitutionality
by interpreting statutes; by subjecting administrative acts to careful
control; and by providing a special form of relief such as habeas corpus in England, the juicio de amparo in Mexico, and the constitutional complaint in Switzerland, Austria, and Germany for individuals who ·wish to complain of violation of "fundamental rights."
One instance of such control is the Conseil d'Etat in France. This
body has emerged as a court of constitutional review, at least with
respect to all administrative actions, and employs rather broad norms
to pass upon the validity of these actions.
Asking why some countries such as France and Soviet Russia
have repudiated judicial control of constitutionality, the author
points out that in the case of France this policy is a continuation
of a long tradition based on a strict conception of separation of
powers and an aversion to the exercise of any kind of authority by
the courts that might seem to be legislative in character. In Russia,
by contrast, the absence of judicial review stems from a complete
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rejection of the separation of powers principle and a commitment
to a philosophy of government that places the entire control of the
state in the political organs.
In reviewing the historical antecedents of judicial review, particularly the stream of thinking that eventually found expression
in the American conception of the Constitution as fundamental law
and the authoritative role of the judiciary in interpreting that law,
the author traces the evolution of the higher law concept from its
roots in classical antiquity, through its formulation as "natural law"
in medieval thinking, and as "the fundamental laws of the realm"
asserted by French Parlements of the ancien regime as against the
French sovereign, to the equating of the common law with fundamental law in the English judicial tradition. Although in the end
parliamentary supremacy prevailed in England, the tradition of a
body of principles superior even to statutory law and a profound
regard for the judiciary and its independence, together with the experience during colonial days when judges disregarded local legislation not in conformity ·with the English law, contributed mightily
to the formulation of constitutional ideas that eventually led to a
doctrine of judicial review which found its classic expression in Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in Ma;rbury v. Madison. 2 The author concludes then that judicial review is the result of an evolutionary pattern common to much of the West, in both civil- and common-law
countries.
In concluding his review of historical antecedents, Professor Cappelletti notes that our own times have seen the burgeoning of "constitutional justice," which combines the form of legal justice and
the substance of natural justice, and that many modern states have
asserted higher law principles through ·written constitutions, thus
achieving a synthesis of three separate concepts: "the supremacy of
certain higher principles, the need to put even the higher law in
written form, and the employment of the judiciary as a tool for
enforcing the constitution against ordinary legislation" (p. 42). Although this union of concepts first occurred in the United States,
many now regard it as essential to the rule of law.
In the last three chapters, the author draws upon his intimate
knowledge of contemporary developments to speak about modern
systems of judicial review. He deals successively with the organs of
judicial control, the process of control, and the effects of control.
These chapters constitute probably the most instructive and illuminating parts of his book. In discussing the organs of control, he
uses the term "centralized review" to refer to the system whereby
special courts are set up-as in Austria, West Germany, Italy, Cyprus, and Yugoslavia-for the purpose of passing on constitutional
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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questions. Even though incidental or decentralized review by the
regular courts in the ordinary course of litigation is not completely
excluded in these systems, the emphasis is upon the unique function
of the constitutional court. In contrast, the American pattern of judicial review followed in a number of other systems relies on "decentralized review" in the sense that ordinary courts have authority
to deal with constitutional questions as a necessary incident to their
power to decide concrete cases and controversies. The author succinctly and interestingly discusses the rationale behind the two different types of review. Decentralized review is the natural and inevitable product of the reasoning employed by Marshall in Marbury
to justify a court's duty and authority to disregard statutory enactments found to be in conflict with the higher law embodied in the
Constitution. Even though this system of review theoretically is
limited to holding that a statute found unconstitutional is not relevant to the disposition of the case before the court and is therefore
binding only on the parties to the case, the practical effect of such
a decision when combined with the doctrine of stare decisis is to
make the statute unenforceable generally. In a system of centralized
review, the whole focus is on the statute and the effect of finding
the statute invalid is to annul it completely.
Turning to the question why some civil-law countries have
adopted a system of centralized judicial review as the primary means
of constitutional control, the author points out that this kind of
review rests on a totally different doctrine of separation of powers
from that upon which decentralized review is founded. The act of
reviewing legislation is viewed as a political rather than an ordinary
judicial function: a tribunal created to discharge this function
should be distinguished from an ordinary court. The manner prescribed by the various constitutions for appointment of the members
of these special constitutional courts and the responsibility of such
courts to decide questions that American courts would usually shy
away from as "political questions" emphasize the recognition of the
political character of this type of judicial review. Moreover, the
centralized system, with its emphasis on the examination of the
statute and its power to annul the statute, reflects the absence of
the principle of stare decisis in civil-law jurisdictions and also reflects the unsuitability of traditional civil-law courts for judicial
review. In this connection, the author makes the point that judges
trained in the civil service to deal primarily with questions of private law do not adapt well to the function of passing on constitutional questions. 3
3. [T]he bulk of Europe's judiciary seems psychologically incapable of the valueoriented, quasi-political functions involved in judicial review. It should be borne
in mind that continental judges usually are "career judges," who enter the judi•
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The distinction between centralized and decentralized review
is reflected not only in the kind of organ used as the vehicle for
judicial review but also in the processes employed by the tribunal.
Again decentralized review, centering on the jurisdiction of ordinary
courts to deal with constitutional questions as incident to the disposition of a concrete case, gives a pre-eminent place to private parties
as the initiators of constitutional issues. Who is a proper party in
interest to raise the issue and whether a given proceeding before
the court is a genuine case or controversy are questions that play a significant role in constitutional litigation in decentralized systems.
The system of centralized review, on the other hand, since it views
the constitutional court as essentially a quasi-political body, gives a
much more prominent role to public organs as the appropriate parties for raising constitutional issues. Indeed, some types of proceedings authorized by constitution or statute to be brought before special constitutional courts would strike the American lawyer or judge
as the equivalent of advisory opinion proceedings.
In the final chapter, the author discusses the effects of control
and the differences again arising from the theory of centralized control on the one hand and what he calls decentralized control on the
other. Under the centralized control theory, the court's decision upon
finding a statute unconstitutional has the same effect as a legislative
repeal of the statute. It is a decision directed against the statute
itself, whereas under the theory of decentralized or incidental review the court's decision concerns only the parties before the court
and technically does not affect the statute except to make it unenforceable, although as a result of the doctrine of stare decisis it may well
have the effect of making the statute a dead letter. The two types
of review also point to possibly different results on the question of
the effect of a decision in terms of its retroactivity. Since a special
constitutional court's annulment of a statute is in substance a superlegislative act, it operates like the repeal of a statute to deny it any
future effect. On the other hand, the finding in a decentralized judicial review process that a statute is unenforceable theoretically
denies the validity of the statute from its inception, although in
practice courts have substantially limited the retroactive consequences of such a decision. Indeed, in recent years, the United States
ciary at a very early age and are promoted to the higher courts largely on the
basis of seniority. Their professional training develops skills in technical rather
than policy-oriented application of statutes. The exercise of judicial review, however, is rather different from the usual judicial function of applying the law.
Modern constitutions do not limit themselves to a fixed definition of what the
law is, but contain broad programs for future action. Therefore the task of fulfilling the constitution often demands a higher sense of discretion than the task
of interpreting ordinary statutes; that is certainly one reason why Kelsen, Calamandrei, and others have considered it to be a legislative rather than a purely
judicial activity. [Pp. 62-63.]
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Supreme Court has limited the retroactive consequences of decisions
that announced new interpretations of the Constitution, particularly
when their effect was to overrule prior decisions.
It is evident that each of the two systems of review has its advantages and disadvantages: Professor Cappelletti makes no attempt to
make out a case for one or the other, although it is evident that he
admires the American system of review and the contribution it has
made to constitutionalism. It may well be too that the differences
bet1veen the two systems of review are not really as great as they
appear on paper and that forces are at work manifesting some convergence, both in basic conceptions and in the processes employed.
These forces are particularly evident in the United States. Judging
by the kinds of cases it elects to review, the United States Supreme
Court regards itself in increasing measure as a central court of constitutional review. To suggest that the disposition of constitutional
issues is simply incident to the determination of cases turning principally on other questions is something of a fiction, since a major
part of litigation is instituted for the very purpose of raising constitutional issues. Moreover, the dilution of the case or controversy
limitations by the common use of declaratory proceedings and, even
more remarkably, by the wholesale erosion now taking place in the
party-in-interest concept, by the free use of class suits, and by the
relatively easy invocation of federal judicial authority to test the
constitutionality not only of statutes and regulations but of threatened or prospective action suggest that the courts, with the blessing
of the Supreme Court, are very hospitable to litigation directed
wholly to constitutional ends and are ready to remove or bypass
obstacles once thought to be associated with the decentralized or incidental type of review.
We are indebted to Professor Cappelletti for this highly illuminating and perceptive portrayal of judicial review in its contemporary aspects. A distinctive value of this book is that it reveals the
many-faceted aspect of judicial review and the organs and processes
for its implementation. An accurate appraisal of distinctions and
differences is the beginning of wisdom in the use of terms and the
evaluation of the institutions under review. Any comparative study
is useful if for no other reason than that it forces critical analysis
of accepted institutions and the procedures and assumptions underlying them. It may also suggest points of unity and convergence that
promise a harmonization with mutually beneficial consequences.
Professor Cappelletti's book is immensely useful in both respects.
It is good that the publishers have issued the book in a less expensive
student edition. This is a volume heartily recommended for teacher
and students alike. While indispensable to those engaged in com-
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parative study, it is the kind of book which if not prescribed should
· at least be highly recommended in any course in constitutional law.

Paul G. Kauper,
Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law,
University of Michigan

